Europe: The Future Relationship
Since Theresa May’s “Brexit means Brexit” moment on the doorstop and her subsequent decision to trigger Article 50 in May 2017, much scrutiny has been shed on the many phases of Brexit negotiations. From shouting contests in parliament, to countless op eds in papers about May, Robbins and Barnier, a constant deafening hum has underlined the last two years, one of the incessant complaining and criticism about how terribly Brexit negotiations are going and, eventually, how bad the deal Theresa May struck was. This never-ending backdrop sprouted into all wings of politics, sowing the seeds for the second referendum and Article 50 cancellation crowd (now formally known as the Lib Dems), arguing that if this was the best we can do then there’s no point in leaving; providing ammunition to the Mark Francois, Nigel Farage and the whole hard Brexit group, who saw this as damning proof that a no-deal exit was the only way to avoid embarrassment; serving as a political get-out-of-jail-free card for the most loyal opposition, as Jeremy Corbyn could always call out “but look at what they’re doing” when under scrutiny for antisemitism; and so on and so forth.
The culmination of all this was of course Boris Johnson’s ascension to power on the promise of a renegotiated deal, because even the Brexiteer-in-chief could barely bring himself to vote for the first edition. Yet, what if the real problem wasn’t with May or Juncker, Robbins or Barnier? What if the media and the public eye were too eager to jump on the “this is going terribly”-bandwagon before considering the conditions which led to Parliament’s Brexit groundhog day? Maybe the big decisions early on can teach us how Boris Johnson’s crew should approach the second, arguably more important, phase of negotiations. Before the not-so-meaningful-votes, the Brussels meeting room walkouts and the botched general election came a decision that predetermined the course of Brexit more than anything else: agreeing to the EU’s timetable.
I’m always reminded of my interview with the political attaché to the Danish Embassy last year who, after I asked him about all the things that had gone wrong with Brexit so far, said that it was our fault we had agreed to the two-phase timetable when we clearly weren’t ready for it. Likewise in the BBC Storyville documentary following Mao Tse-hofstadt’s team in Brussels, you feel a sense of... surprise when the EU sees their timetable accepted by the UK instantly. From the EU’s perspective, the timetable they proposed (two phases: a withdrawal negotiation or “divorce bill” over two years followed by a future relationship negotiation which would be determined later) played right into their hands. In the two years after Brexit, they would have to determine a new EU budget and face elections in the Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany and Spain, all countries with growing populist movements. This meant a really testing time ahead for the EU as their aims to further integration would now need to face the ballot box. Brexit could be used as ammunition. A single bill would give the press time to speculate and spin about how badly meetings in Brussels were going, while no marked legal process would take a potential successful Brexit out of the hands of European populists, hoping to prove to voters that they had been right all along. Instead the EU dragged out negotiations, playing the morally upstanding and collected political body while Theresa may played politics at home. EU ambitions aside, if this was pushing ourselves into a corner then why did Theresa May do it?
The pressure from Gina Miller on one side and the “no time to dither, get on with it” ERG and UKIP on the other meant that May had to come off strong and as a determined newborn Brexiteer. She alluded to it with her “Brexit means Brexit” speech upon moving in to no.10 and she seemingly proved it when she triggered article 50 in March. No dither. No delay. Yet, this really forced us into a corner. As “the brains behind Brexit” (Daniel Hannan) explained at a talk last year, he too was shocked by this initial decision for its foolhardiness, expecting the UK and EU to come to a middle ground which they would continue to negotiate from. What was the alternative then?
Let us remember that, because this was the first time a member state had triggered Article 50, all options were on the table. A solution which was alluded to by Michel Barnier early on was the same two-year withdrawal negotiation period (maintaining the EU’s wish for a large period of media spin) but with separate agreements and separate bills being negotiated individually. This would let Parliament find where they agreed and disagreed specifically and allow Theresa May to show progress in her battle with Brussels. Likewise, many had floated the idea of handing the negotiations to a cross- party committee, meaning agreed bills would not need to rely on only one side of the house because of political partisanship, as well as keeping Labour in check.
Yet, none of the such happened and we instead ended up where we are today. The past is set in stone, so what can we learn from it as we (hopefully) step into the second stage of negotiations? Firstly, there’s no need for a single bill. MPs all have their own red lines and submitting one colossal agreement to Parliament treads on a lot of them, while passing individual bills on individual matters would help find middle ground. This would be a useful tool in separating the energy and education debate from the immigration debate, as well as separating the customs union camp from the single market camp, all political factions in parliament we know have little will to compromise.
Secondly, ask Parliament. May went to Brussels so she could prove something, Boris has already proven a lot to Parliament and will do even more so with the next election. Whatever deal(s) Boris strikes, they will have to go through Parliament no matter what, so drawing inspiration from MPs beforehand will facilitate every step. Finally, build downwards. The major sticking points over the last few years (Northern Ireland, political declaration) came later on in the negotiations, after a lot of other things were sorted. Citizens’ rights, transport coordination and potential continued CERN and Erasmus membership were sorted early on but allowed to be used later as political bargaining chips for the bigger stuff. This can’t be allowed to happen again as we can’t jeopardise our position as we negotiate the tightest and most complex agreement between a nation and a trading bloc ever struck.
written by Louis Jacques