Why development should be allowed even if local infrastructure and public services are overwhelmed
Whilst urban development will often lead to strains on our public services, this ought to be seen as an acceptable consequence of our freedoms. Further, to otherwise restrict development and follow its reasoning to its ideological conclusion is thoroughly incompatible with liberty.
Among planners and politicians one of the most popular arguments against the unrestricted freedom to build houses is that development will put strain on local infrastructure and public services. This is believed to then justify the planning system i.e. restrictions on the freedom to build. However, in this work I show such reasoning must ultimately lead to a chilling authoritarian state, monitoring and controlling where individuals go to work, how their gardens are decorated, and what they decide to eat. I thus reject the infrastructure argument, and defend the freedom to build i.e. the abolition of the planning system. With this in mind let us proceed.
The Infrastructure Argument
The infrastructure argument runs as follows:
P1: Freedom may be constrained where its exercise will put a strain on local infrastructure
P2: The freedom to build housing puts a strain on local infrastructure
C: The freedom to build housing may be constrained
The reasoning behind the first premise is strain on local infrastructure harms the community, and harming others warrants restricting freedom. Here the harm is embodied by longer GP waiting lists, larger classroom sizes and more congested roads. It appears even J. S. Mill may be able to endorse this premise, for he writes: [T]he only purpose for which power may rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community...is to prevent harm to others`- in other words, the harm principle.
The second premise is undoubtedly true when the freedom is considered in the round. This is because particular exercises of such freedom undoubtedly do strain infrastructure. It should be noted though the conclusion the freedom to build may be constrained is not unqualified. Rather, the first premise only supports constrains where infrastructure will be strained (harming others). Therefore if developers put no strain on infrastructure (as when the developer provides all the infrastructure itself) they could not be stopped from building - by this argument alone.
Here some libertarians may accept the above and argue reform of the planning system, local government financing and the privatisation of public services (or the creation of private covenant communities) could seriously diminish the odds development would put a strain on infrastructure. Constrains on the freedom to build would thus be unjustifiable in all but a limited number of cases. House building could then precede largely unstopped solving Britain's housing crisis. The case for today's extensive planning permission would thus be defeated.
The following could elaborate on these reforms and thus defend the abolition of planning permission while still accepting the infrastructure argument. However, this has been done better by libertarians elsewhere. Given this, the following attempts to refute the infrastructure argument by propounding it proves too much by permitting a chilling authoritarian state which infringes upon personal freedom.
Proving Too Much?
To prove this contention let us consider a set of thought experiments. Imagine a town where urban planners have anticipated each woman will have an average of two children, and have planned for local infrastructure accordingly, but this number then increases to three. Or consider a town where most working age people decide to invite their elderly parents, from outside the area, to live with them in their homes. And finally muse the possibility of a larger number of workers unexpectedly deciding to take jobs in another area via an already congested road system.
In all these examples strain is put on local infrastructure via the exercise of freedoms i.e. to have children, to invite elderly parents home, and to choose where to work. If the first premise of the infrastructure argument is accepted, then constrains on these freedoms must be accepted also. Individuals could be limited to only having so many children, having their choice of employment restricted, and conditionally prohibited from re-homing their elderly parents. Britain could follow in the footsteps of Communist China and Soviet Russia which both implemented these policies. And, in part, it would do so for the same reason, namely: Planning for the greater good warrants restrictions on individual freedom.
The Infrastructure Argument Refined
Against this rebuttal it may be argued it fails to distinguish between freedoms which are important and those which are not. As Jeremy Waldron argues, not all interests in freedom warrant protection by rights. Accepting this the infrastructure argument may be refined as follows:
P4: Freedom which is relatively unimportant may be constrained where its exercise will put a strain on local infrastructure
P5: The freedom to build housing puts a strain on local infrastructure
P6: The freedom to build housing is relatively unimportant
C2: The freedom to build housing may be constrained
Given we can class the freedom to have children, choose wherever we want to work, and invite our elderly parents home important; and the freedom to build relatively unimportant, it follows the freedom to build housing can be constrained, while not committing us to socialist-style birth and employment controls. The libertarian who favours the total abolition of planning laws is thus defeated.
Still Proving Too Much
This counter-rebuttal is unacceptable though: For it is self-contradictory, potentially destructive of personal freedoms, or simply fails in its ambitions (to justify planning permission). Let us begin by considering its contradictory nature. It has been agreed it is unacceptable to restrict where individuals go to work on infrastructure grounds. This is because doing so indirectly restricts which occupation, job or role an individual can take up which is important to everyone. However, if an individual's freedom to choose his occupation cannot be restricted on infrastructure grounds, then it follows the landowner's freedom to choose the occupation of developer cannot be restricted on infrastructure grounds either. For modern liberals such as Waldron and Joseph Raz I believe this argument is decisive against any support they may procure for planning permission (at least on infrastructure grounds).
Nonetheless, others may argue I have adopted the wrong metric for accounting for importance. It is not, they may suggest, the importance of the freedom to choose occupation to the individual which matters, rather it is its importance to the community. To the community the general freedom to choose occupation and have children is important, but the landowner's freedom to choose to become a developer is relatively unimportant (even though, by assumption, both cause the same infrastructure strain). Thus according to this understanding of importance the refined infrastructure argument still goes through. Before I move onto an external objection to this understanding though, let us make an internal criticism.
I believe this argument probably fails to justify today's extensive planning permission though. This is because the freedom for landowners to become developers, i.e. to build homes, is actually seriously important to the community. In England and Wales today average house prices are 8.92 times higher than median incomes, rising to 13.73 and 10.74 median income in London and the South East respectively. Just as the community has an interest in being free to have children, choose their work, and re-home their elderly parents, so they have an interest in developers being free to build houses to reduce these astounding ratios, even if infrastructure is severely strained. Against this it may be argued the community would still consider house-building freedom relatively unimportant, because it values good infrastructure as more important than lower house prices. How to determine what the community believes to be important freedoms versus relatively unimportant is hard to decide.
The Consequentialist Infrastructure Argument
Ultimately, I believe the only coherent means available for those favouring planning permission is to only permit those freedoms which advance the general welfare (a la Bentham), sometimes known as the greater good. All will depend on how any cost-benefit analysis works out then. Maybe more freedom to develop without infrastructure is for greater good, maybe it isn't (of course the best option is probably more housing and infrastructure). I formulate this new argument below.
P7: Freedom which does not advance the greater good may be prohibited
P8: The freedom to build housing puts a strain on local infrastructure, and although reducing house prices, is still not for the greater good
C3: The freedom to build housing may be prohibited
Of course in certain locations P8 will differ and therefore the conclusion will too, but the essence of the argument should be clear.
The Authoritarianism of Consequentialist Planning
At this point defenders of the planning system may believe they are in a solid position: Defending freedom for the greater good. The very reverse is true, because the consequentialism grounding their argument would lead to an authoritarian state continually monitoring, and controlling individuals. In the words of Bentham: `Every gesture, every turn of limb or feature, in whose motions have a visible impact on the general happiness, will be noted and marked down` Ponder these three examples as proof of this verdict.
First, consider the freedom to choose your occupation and its location again. If enough commuters become sufficiently frustrated by additional traffic, and you don't value the extra wages paid by commuting yourself enough, then this freedom may be justifiably extinguished. After all, the widespread benefit of reduced traffic will be greater than the cost to you of foregoing the wage differential. And thus the greater good would be advanced by a prohibition on your freedom.
Second, the opinions of people would allow infringements upon your freedom to use your personal property as you please. Imagine you wanted to put some gnomes and strange flowers in your front garden; if enough of your neighbours and passersby disliked the display, and you didn't enjoy it sufficiently, the council could prohibit it. No doubt nosy committees could be called upon to regulate gardens, sheds and housing exteriors.
Third, such consequentialism would allow for overwhelming paternalism. Consider an obese individual who sincerely wants to lose weight, his freedom to buy another pack of chocolate digestives isn't for his own good, let alone others. His freedom to buy biscuits is thus never for the greater good, and therefore, given only freedom for the greater good should be allowed, it must be prohibited. To ensure the effectiveness of this the state could regulate credit card companies to ensure cards would not purchase such items (and, of course, abolish cash to stop workarounds).
Finally, it must be considered whether we want our fundamental freedoms to be solely justified on the grounds of promoting the greater good. Can we really accept individuals could be prohibited from having children, as in Communist China, simply because a cost-benefit analysis says it's not for the greater good? I think not.
Conclusion
Clearly all these conclusions are unacceptable. Individuals should be free even if their actions don't advance the greater good. The consequentialist infrastructure argument must therefore be rejected. In its place must stand a firm defence of freedom. The freedom restricting planning system must thus be regarded as unjustifiable, and thus, individuals ought to be free to build wherever they so please.
Am I suggesting nothing should be done to alleviate strain on infrastructure? No, local government financing should change to meet demand. Nonetheless, in the mean time, the serious strain on infrastructure still doesn't warrant restricting the freedom to build housing - without also allowing a chilling authoritarian state: A most unacceptable prospect.