Beyond Proportionality: The Democratic Merits of the Westminster Model

One of the major criticisms of the so called "Westminster Model" expressed by an overwhelming majority of the smaller parties, and even the Labour party, is that it is simply not fair. Proportional representation was an initial flagship policy of Starmer’s election campaign yet was subsequently reneged on. Whilst it does not take a constitutional savant to deduce that these U-turns were done simply in anticipation of comfortable majorities, this doesn't mean that the Westminster model is any less democratic than the proposed 'proportional' system.   

The biggest downside of the 'majoritarian' system we have today is one that not even a plurality of votes can translate into a majority of seats, as shown at the 1951 general election, whereby Winston Churchill won 48% of the vote compared to Clement Attlee’s 48.8% yet managed to hold an 8-seat majority. Arguably this is a peculiar case in British elections, but many rightfully object that a party never wins 50% of the vote, yet single party majorities will consistently emerge from elections, with the very rare case of a coalition/minority government. The supposed 'inherent evil' of this system is founded in a simple belief of 'giving power' to the voters, abiding by the dogma of "x votes mean x seats!" I reject the dogma of proportionality as the being the only axiom of democracy and show that the Westminster model reaps democratic advantages impossible under proportional systems.  

A major advantage of our incumbent model is the relationship between the voter and the government: the election decides the government. This is because the formation of single party majorities in parliament is a de-facto selection of the government: the party that wins the legislature wins the government. Under proportionality, the relationship is a lot more distorted. Instead of the voter authorising the government, they surrender this right to a plethora of smaller parties to decide amongst themselves, thus depriving the electorate of any bargaining power over who the government formateurs are. 

There are also genuine benefits of majoritarianism on voter cognition, where having one party control every ministry and by extension every policy, means it is much easier for voters to comprehend who is to blame for what, unlike the spontaneously, ever-changing ministerial control between numerous parties in coalition governments.  

This is not to say that the complaint that parliament is 'unrepresentative' is any less important than the criticisms outlined above, but it is to say that it isn't any more important. Both the 'first past the post' and 'proportional' models have a vision of democracy, where both are logically legitimate, and thus I reject the claim that proportional representation is inherently better, but simply shares a different view on how democracy should work.