Why we need the House of Lords

Throughout the British public, there is a generally denigrative attitude towards the House of Lords. Many focus on the 'remnants of the aristocracy' and elements of theocracy symptomatic of the hereditary and spiritual peers in the upper chamber, respectively, or what they perceive as blatant cronyism through the informal arrangement of 'paying for peerages', involving wealthy party donors being elevated in a blatantly plutocratic fashion. It cannot be denied that such elements do little to bolster the legitimacy of the upper chamber; however, to focus exclusively on its shortcomings is to ignore the substantial benefit the Lords bestow upon our constitution.

The hyper-partisan and tightly whipped two-party system that is the House of Commons not only leads to a concerningly strong executive branch that possesses the monopoly on agenda setting and legislative success, but it also results in lazy laws. The most common demonstration of this laziness is the increasing number of 'skeleton bills,' described as such due to providing only the basic principles of a policy, i.e., the skeleton, and leaving all the intricate 'meaty' details to be filled in by ministers via the use of delegated legislation. Much of this is due to a general epistocratic starvation in the Commons, such that parliament is rarely comprised of experts but rather partisan actors whose aim is often to 'climb the greasy pole.' The Lords, on the other hand, do the exact opposite.

Our upper chamber embraces expertise: conducting 'select committees' containing around 12 experts in an industry who are appointed to consider specific policy areas. To return to the previous metaphor, they provide the 'meat' of the bill that fills in the skeleton created by the Commons. Realistically, if one wishes to strive for the best governance, they must look beyond the parochialisms of parliamentary politics towards a genuinely insightful legislative review. Take, for instance, the field of defence: the House of Lords has a specifically designated International Relations and Defence Committee, comprising a former NATO Secretary General, lawyers, and doctors of international relations. In the House of Commons, on the other hand, we might get a fireplace salesman. Conclusively, it is irrefutable that partisan politics is insufficient to ensure a strong legislative review, and as a result, we should cherish rather than chastise the unparalleled legislative insight provided by the Lords.

However, this is not to say the Lords are infallible. Following the Blair reform to the House of Lords in 1999, the connotations of aristocracy were watered down by the abolition of all but 92 hereditary peers, but there was little verisimilitude in this being an inherent democratisation of the chamber. The 'reform' initiated by Blair simply accentuated the hyper-partisan approach to legislation, and the increased power of the prime minister to nominate life peers saw wealthy Labour donors ascending to the chamber in what became known as the Cash-for-Honours scandal. Even after the scandal, the plutocratic sleaze lives on through the informal transaction of £3 million in party donations, granting donors a seat. Despite this, these perfectly amendable issues do not negate the need for an upper chamber that can provide an epistocratic vision of democracy.

Ultimately, the House of Lords is of paramount importance to the UK constitution, allowing for a uniquely autonomous and academic-calibre veto player to provide insightful scrutiny of legislation, unburdened from the coercion of tight party discipline and partisan politics. If anything, we should be complaining that it isn't strong enough.